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PetSmart Searches for a Sustainable Strategy 
 
Abstract 
This case details a PetSmart’s struggle to find a sustainable strategy. It was started as a 
“big box” pet specialty category killer store in 1986. It went public in 1993 and rapidly 
expanded through acquisition. It focused on product variety and price which put it in 
direct competition with mass merchants, especially discounters and wholesale clubs. 
Loses in the 1990s led the company to hire Philip Francis to turn the operation around. 
As a result of restructuring dictated by Mr. Francis, PetSmart became profitable. Its 
supply chain was improved by adding distribution centers, standardizing and down-sizing 
stores, improving product quality, increasing services offered, moving away from a low 
price orientation, and developing a customer and pet friendly in-store experience. Robert 
Moran took over leadership of PetSmart in 2009. His emphasis has been on realizing the 
humanization of pets as members of the family, focusing on PetSmart’s target market, 
increasing store productivity, and adding new stores more slowly. 
 
The Pet Market in the USA 
 
Americans love pets.  In fact, approximately 62 percent of households have at least one 
pet.  They own approximately 172 million fresh water fish, 94 million cats, 78 million 
dogs, 15 million birds, 14 million small animals, 13 million horses and 11 million salt 
water fish. Total spending on pets for 2010 is estimated at $47.7 billion. Pet food alone 
accounts for $17.6 billion followed by vet care at $12 billion, supplies/OTC medicine at 
$10.4 billion, pet services at $3.4 and animal purchases at $2.2 billion1.  Table 1 below 
itemizes the average annual cost of maintaining of maintaining dogs and cats by category 
of spending.  It shows that while pet food is important other expenses, especially 
veterinarian expenses, make up a larger portion of the total. 
 
Table 1 Average Annual Amount Spent on Dogs and Cats 
Cost category                   Dogs                    Cats 
Surgical vet visits $555 $278 
Kennel boarding   273   225 
Food   229   203 
Routine vet visits   225   203 
Groomer/grooming aids     66     22 
Treats       4     37 
Vitamins     61     28 
Toys     40     19 
Source:  American Pet Products Association, 2012 
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Retail Structure/Competition 
 
Because the market for pet food is large, it is sold through numerous retail 
channels: supermarkets, pet superstores, mass marketers, farm and feed stores, vets and 
kennels, warehouse clubs, and other stores.  More recently dollar stores, drug stores and 
internet retailers have expanded their offerings in pet food, accessories and medical 
related items. Table 2 below details the share of sales by channel and the sales trend 2.  
The U.S. Census of Retail Trade reported 7,626 pet and pet food supply stores with sales 
of $7.6 billion in 2002.  Five years later there were 8,782 stores with sales of $11.4 
billion.  Average sales per store jumped 29 percent to almost $1.3 million. The industry 
was highly fragmented until 1990 when pet food superstores like PetsMart and PETCO 
began a consolidation of the industry.  The 2007 Census shows the top four firms with 
2,039 stores, $7.1 billion in sales and average store sales of almost $3.5 million.  The 
remaining stores averaged only $641,000 in sales3.  Clearly, the big box category killer 
superstores are marginalizing the smaller stores and firms. 
 
Table 2 
Pet Food Distribution Channels 
Channel            Share of  Sales                  Trend 
Supermarkets 39 Up 
Pet superstores 21 Up 
Mass merchandisers 22 Up 
Farm and feed stores   8 Flat 
Vets and kennels   7 Flat 
Warehouse clubs   3 Up 
Other   7 Down 
 
Source:  Mintel, The Pet Food & Supplies Market, 2007 
 
PetsMart’s Situation (1999-2001) 
 
In 2001, PetsMart was a national pet retailer operating 484 stores.  It started in 1986, 
went public in 1993, and grew rapidly mainly through acquisition of regional specialty 
stores4 (see Appendix A). As a publicly traded company (PETM), it was experiencing 
stagnant growth across the chain and a declining stock price ($29 to two dollars a share 
from 1997 to 2001).  Gross profit had declined by three percentage points from 2000, and 
operating costs had climbed seven percentage points, negatively impacting the bottom 
line.  Growth from new stores was also problematic.  Incremental store openings totaled 
just one from 1999 to 2001.  Sales per square foot were declining: in 1999 sales averaged 
$177 per square foot, 2000 sales averaged $163, and 2001 sales averaged $160.  
Comparable store sales growth was equally alarming at 6.3 percent, 4.6 percent, and 1.4 
percent in 1999, 2000, and 2001 respectively.  Debt to equity was sharply rising, with 
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PetsMart reporting negative asset gains from 1999 to 2001.  PetsMart’s costs were 
growing quickly, with no offset from revenues5 (See Appendix B). 
 
The problems faced by PetsMart could be attributed to their warehouse strategy, which 
offered bulk product at the best price.  Stores operated on low labor costs and minimal 
services resulting in a lower price.  Supply chain issues were part of PetsMart’s problem, 
with Mr. Francis commenting that “PetsMart's distribution model was of 1960’s design”.  
Challenges affecting PetsMart included: 
 
 30 day lead time for product to reach stores. 
 36,000 square foot stores with 16,000 square feet dedicated to back stock. 
 $750,000 tied up in inventory at each location. 
 
PetsMart also realized very little revenue from ancillary services.  In 2001, ancillary 
services, such a grooming, accounted for five percent of total sales with little room to 
expand6. 
 
PetsMart’s downward spiral was due to competition, distribution, and supply chain 
inefficiencies.    PetsMart’s competition came primarily from two sources:   mass 
channels such as Walmart and Target, and pet specialty channels such as PETCO and 
regional independents.  Mass channels were price focused; building their brands on value 
and convenience.  During 2001, mass retailer Wal-Mart was expanding at a rapid rate.  
They were nearing 3,500 stores nationwide, and located within five miles of most 
American residences.  With Walmart controlling price, scale, and customer traffic at their 
supercenters, competing head-to-head on a price strategy guaranteed little chance of 
survival.  Target’s approach was similar to Walmart’s. They targeted Wal-Mart's low 
price and increased theirs by a few cents.  Target was more concerned about creating a 
customer experience to attract the middle income shopper rather than competing on price 
alone.  In contrast to Target, Mr. Francis commented “in 2001, PetsMart looked like 
Home Depot having a bad day”6.  Their warehouse store was under a price attack by 
mass competition, and their stores were not in position to offer consumers a differentiated 
shopping experience.  Mass channels were driving the margins out of consumables, 
pulling customers into their stores to capitalize on profitable hard goods. 
 
With PetsMart trying to combat the increased competition on price from the mass 
channels, PETCO and other independent channels began challenging PetsMart 
distribution.  Offering similar brands and products, PETCO was winning with a customer 
service approach.  Their core customers looked to “pamper” their pets, through upscale 
goods and consumables.  They were not as concerned about mass channel attack on price, 
as their profitability involved higher price points to drive profit margin.  In PETCO’s 
model, guests were willing to trade price for an improved shopping experience.  PETCO 
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maintained steady growth, and their distribution outlets were similar in number to 
PetsMart's.   
 
Another issue pressing the survival of PetsMart was the change in product distribution 
driven by venders.  In 2001 Procter and Gamble decided that their newly acquired brand 
Iams was suited for broader distribution.  In 2000 Iams was sold exclusively through pet 
specialty channels and independent retailers.   Iams was introduced into the mass channel 
in 2001, instantly causing a negative effect on PetsMart’s sales.  The volume loss from 
competition on a differentiating brand was substantial, as was the reduction in consumers 
entering the store.  Mr. Francis concluded that “Initially Iams going mass costs us two 
percent in sales revenue, and two percent due to [consumer] trip revenue.6” Procter and 
Gamble was not the only major brand opening distribution to mass channels, multiple 
vendors followed suit, fueling a price war. 
 
In 2000 PetsMart stores had about 700 square feet dedicated to services, primarily 
grooming.  Services accounted for three and a half percent of total store space.  “We used 
to have to conduct [dog] training in the backroom.”  Ancillary services at PetsMart 
initially had little traction.  “There has always been a market for boarding dogs and cats, 
usually by a mom and pop facility.  Boarding locations were systematically under- 
capitalized.”  Veterinary services were inexistent as were day care offerings for working 
or vacationing families’ pets.  Service was not a part of PetsMart’s warehouse strategy, 
nor was online shopping.  PETS.COM, a competing e-retailer, quickly realized what Mr. 
Francis described as a “density of volume” problem.  “A $20 bag of dog food costs $20 
to ship.  A $60 Dog-Gloo costs $60 to ship.6” 
 
PetsMart was competing in an industry whose profitability anchored on hard goods such 
as leashes and toys, yet whose survival was conjoined with consumables such as food and 
treats.  Low margin consumables were used to drive customers to the store, in which they 
would then fill their shopping carts with high margin hard goods.  Consumables were 
split by species, with dog items anchoring sales with 80 percent of total volume.  Within 
the consumable side of the business, the major players included Mars (Nutro), Purina, 
Masterfoods, and Procter and Gamble (Iams).  Each brand also distributed product 
offerings across various types of retailer.  In order to encourage trading-up, pet stores 
place their premium products on front shelves, and the widely distributed grocery and 
mass products in the back of the store.   
 
Decisions to Be Made 
 
Before joining PetsMart as president and chief executive officer in March 1998, Mr. 
Francis was president and CEO of Shaw's Supermarkets and corporate vice president of 
wholesale for Roundy's, Inc.  He had spent his career in and around the grocery channel, 
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and understood the power of supply chain, operations, and retail administration.  He had 
been on the board of directors for PetsMart since 1989, but as he said in a college 
presentation, “you learn quickly that middle managers have a better idea of where the 
company is heading, than the members of the board.”1  Mr. Francis’ time spent as a 
member of the board turned into full control after a planned succession fell through.  
Upon becoming CEO, Mr. Francis was very concerned about how to build trust.  “I was 
very careful to watch how I used my pronouns when I joined PetsMart.  I made sure I 
asked ‘how is our business’ instead of ‘how is your business’.  I always framed it as 
though I had been there for years by asking ‘what did we do…”7 
 
Mr. Francis immediately began laying the groundwork for future growth.  “We started off 
pretty sober, knowing that of every five turnarounds, four are not successful.  If there's 
anything we did to begin the turnaround process, it's simply that we took the view that we 
needed to fix the core business and its broken elements. At that time, we weren't focused 
on growth, on branding, or on any of the fancy things. We had a company where 
inadequate infrastructure was the issue, and we methodically began with that work first.”8 
 
Mr. Francis entered the business competing against “category killers”, retailers standing 
on two legs – dominant variety and dominant price.  With the colossal growth of 
Walmart, who was offering exceptional variety and price, “I saw the need to add more 
legs to the two-legged stool.  Why [would consumers] come to a bad looking store just 
for price?”  Continuing to compete head to head with mass retailers solely on price was 
not an option for PetSmart.6 
 
Pressure on product assortment was also a concern.  When Mr. Francis took control of 
PetsMart in 1999, he presented a challenge to senior management. “What happens when 
one of our key exclusive brands go mass?”6 Mr. Francis began generating ideas to 
combat such a problem, so when Iams began distribution into the mass channel in 2001, 
PetSmart was prepared.  Mr. Francis was also looking at ways to utilize scale, and ways 
to create an environment that would offer more then just low priced dog food. 
 
From PetsMart to PetSmart 
 
Upon assuming control Mr. Francis immediately began drawing from previous 
experience to identify inefficiencies in the supply chain.  As for profitability measures, 
strategically placed distribution centers would weed out almost $80 million of excess 
inventory, freeing up cash and increasing the profitability of PetSmart.  Distribution 
centers would also decrease store inventory and shipment lead times.  Within a year of 
his assumption of control, PetSmart developed three central distribution centers, two for 
consumables and one for hard goods.6 
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While working on supply chain issues, Mr. Francis also identified the situation as a 
chance to change the dynamics and direction of the company. Mr. Francis systematically 
left the warehouse culture and began to focus on shopper experience.  He changed the 
capitalization of the firm’s name, from PetsMart (The dog food mass merchandiser) to 
PetSmart (the place for “pet parents” to find positive ways to improve their pet’s life). 
 
He changed the prototype store to a smaller footprint, from 36,000 square feet to 26,000 
square feet, as excess inventory would now be kept in the DCs instead of the back room 
of stores.  This increased the percentage of selling space and improved store productivity.  
He also looked at methods to change the dynamics of the store front.   Mr. Francis’ 
challenge to add “more legs to the stool” soon developed into a winning strategy.  “We 
became a five legged stool focusing on price, variety, customer service, in-store 
experience, and ancillary services.”6 PetSmart was shedding their warehouse pedigree 
and looking to create a shopping experience for pet parents and their pets.6 
 
In migrating away from a low price strategy, Mr. Francis identified other potential drivers 
for shoppers to enter the store.  Pet services were a growing industry, and could be used 
to generate loyalty and excitement in store.  Grooming services were already in place, but 
did not generate the traffic and profitability necessary for growth.  PetSmart began 
looking at offerings such as veterinarian clinics (PetsHospitals), and day/night care 
facilities for owners leaving on work or vacation trips (PetsHotels).  Services requiring 
less capital were also developed, including pet photography and in-store training.  “Pet 
Photography is a much bigger, higher margin service then most realize.”6 
 
PetHotels, a day/night care for dogs, began as an idea from the creator of Alpha Graphics, 
a Kinko’s-like company with 1,500 stores in 17 countries.  When the founder brought the 
idea to Mr. Francis, he initially approached the concept with reservation.  Initially, Mr. 
Francis opened a 5,000 sq. foot addition to a local PetSmart and continually expanded the 
idea.  With input from customers, and increasing popularity in testing markets, a larger 
7,000 square foot PetsHotel was opened.  This facility added expanded play space for 
dogs, as well as various activities and feeding treats.  “Unlike Hilton and Sheraton, 
PetHotels business is highest on the weekend, with pet owners leaving out of town.”6 
PetHotels offer 24 hour care for visiting pets, clean facilities, and recycled air every two 
to three minutes.   
“We have a morning snack, which is dairy-free frozen yogurt and afternoon ‘Yappy 
Hour’.  We also have ‘Doggie Day Camp’ for all our hotel guests. The dogs go to 
supervised play time throughout the day. We have a phone booth. The owner can call in, 
and your ‘friend’ can meow or bark at you. It's a speakerphone, so if the human is in 
tough shape and needs to hear from their dog, we can respond to that need. Our guests 
drink filtered water. We turn the air over every few minutes. We have suites that include 
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a cot with a fleece blanket and a television turned to Animal Planet. People are thrilled to 
have the choices. It's kind of a guilt reliever for the human who has to abandon their pet 
for a short time.”9 
One of the reasons PetSmart has been able to capitalize on the PetHotels concept comes 
from decisions based on scale.  “It costs $1.1 million today to add a PetHotels.  It costs 
$2.6 million to build a free standing hotel.  Expanding a PetHotel involves extreme 
capital efficiency.”  Mr. Francis also added, “We can also put a vet in there all night to 
capitalize on the facilities.”  PetSmart currently dedicates 7,700 sq. feet to stores geared 
with a PetHotels, roughly 30 percent of a typical 26,000 sq. foot store.6   
 
Another service offering incorporated into the store layout was the joint venture with 
Banfield, a highly regarded veterinary company located in the Pacific Northwest.  
Banfield was originally founded in 1955, and by 1990 had become a trusted name in pet 
care.  In-store hospitals were designed to offer convenience to consumers and are 
currently targeted toward non-veterinary schools demographics.  “Veterinary school 
graduates practice close to the schools they attend.  Why saturate the market with 
PetHospitals?”  Mr. Francis described another advantage of multiple ancillary offerings, 
“having grooming housed with a vet allows a groomer to question the vet concerning 
animal they are working on.”6 
 
In reinventing PetSmart’s image, Mr. Francis brought another key strategy from his 
grocery background into the pet specialty channel, loyalty cards.  PetSmart’s card, 
PetPerks, provided core shoppers with promotional discounts which increased loyalty.  
From the company’s perspective, the addition of PetPerks was not just to provide value to 
shoppers, but to understand what services were being used and how to cross merchandise.  
For example, if PetSmart noticed that a customer was using PetHotels, buying food, but 
not taking advantage of grooming services, they would target mail a coupon for a “free 
bath”.  PetSmart could also identify which promotions drove the highest trips, which 
brands commanded the most loyalty, and the impact of price elasticity on their customers. 
One of the more strategic choices was the decision not to sell dogs to customers.  
PetSmart decided instead to undertake a very aggressive adoption program. It facilitates 
approximately 1,100 pet adoptions daily and almost five million since the inception of the 
program.10 When customers want to adopt a dog, they begin by searching a PetSmart 
sponsored website, 1-800-Save-A-Pet.com. This site enables potential owners to search 
for dogs that are available at adoption agencies across the country.  They can also search 
by characteristics such as size, color, and age.  The website also creates an emotional tie 
to the pet with photos and profiles available for each animal. This concept has two major 
impacts on the business.  First, the new owner picks up the adopted pet at a local 
PetSmart, and becomes emotionally attached to the PetSmart brand.  Second, new pet 
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parents will initially spend several hundred dollars in veterinary services, hard goods, and 
consumables. 
 
Thus, the company moved away from a product and low price strategy to a differentiation 
strategy emphasizing service, total pet solutions resulting in greater customer loyalty.  
With the addition of services, price became less of a liability.  Mr. Francis focused on 
services to outpace the price value. “One of our big bags of Purina is $20.  We try to 
price our food within five percent of Wal-Mart.  Let’s say on Wal-Mart beats us on price 
by $1.50.  Would customers be willing to visit a store that provides adoption, training, 
grooming, and food for a $1.50 premium?”  Shoppers who take advantage of pet services 
will pay a slightly higher price for convenience. 
 
Mr. Francis focused on differentiated distribution to drive loyalty and increase revenue.  
PetSmart introduced private label offerings and explored niche markets.  Many of their 
products can only be found in pet specialty channels.  High margin super premium brands 
and organic products are not currently offered in club, grocery, and mass channels.  
PetSmart carries full distribution of bridge (products bridging grocery and specialty – 
Iams or Purina ONE) and grocery brands, strategically trying to trade their shoppers up to 
premium brands.  
 
Mr. Francis understood the need for an online presence, even though competitor 
PETS.COM had failed in the online market.  Selling smaller specialty products like 
shampoos and hard goods can generate incremental volume online.  “We focused on 
content and community when looking at an online strategy”.6  Mr. Francis’ criterion for a 
successful online site involves driving in-store traffic.   PetSmart made a strategic 
decision to discontinue their mail-out circular.  Their monthly ads are now online.  
PetSmart.com provides vast resources on pet adoption and care, with subtle product 
solutions for interested consumers.  PetSmart is also trying to defend against low 
overhead online giants such as Amazon stealing share in high profit hard goods. 
 
Where is PetSmart today? 
 
Through the leadership of Philip Francis, PetSmart has been transformed from a 
struggling price fixated retailer, to a pet care goliath.  The pet specialty store segment of 
the market is dominated by PetSmart and to a lesser extent PETCO. PetSmart has 1,232 
stores with sales of $6.1 billion and a market share of 44.4 percent. PETCO has 
approximately 1,000 stores with revenue of $2.9 billion and a market share of 20.7 
percent. Other companies include Pet Supplies Plus which operates 239 stores in 22 
states, generates $540 million is sales with a market share of 3.6 percent; Pet 
Supermarket operates 115 stores in the southeast, California and Nevada, generating 
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$235 million in sales with a market share of 1.6 percent; and Pet Food Express operates 
41 stores in northern California, generates sales of $90 million with a market share of less 
than one percent.11 The rest of the specialty pet store segment is highly fragmented and 
made up of small chains and independent operators. 
 
Philip Francis was succeeded by Robert Moran as president in 2009 and CEO and 
chairman in 2012. Prior to joining PetSmart, he was president of Toys ‘R’ Us Canada, 
spent 20 years at Sears in various financial and merchandising positions including 
president of Sears de Mexico. He was also an executive with Galerias Precidas of 
Madrid, Spain.10 
 
Mr. Moran is very excited about the chances for future growth of PetSmart. He sees 
PetSmart reaching maturity with 1,800 stores in the U.S. PetSmart currently has 1,232 
store including 1,154 in the U.S., 73 in Canada and 5 in Puerto Rico. It typically opens 40 
to 50 new stores annually. Stores range in size from 12,000 to 27,500 square feet and 
carry approximately 10,000 unique stock keeping units. In addition, it offers pet 
grooming and training in all stores plus pet boarding through their PetSmart Hotels or 
PetsHotels brands and 799 veterinary hospitals in conjunction with Banfield under the 
name Banfield The Pet Hospital. Loyalty is built with their PetPerks program. PetSmart 
also connects with pet parents via their e-commerce web site PetSmark.com.10 
 
PetSmart’s vision is “to become the Happiness in Store experience that our 
knowledgeable, caring associates deliver to our pet parents each day”. The foundation to 
creating an in-store experience by providing solutions that help pets live long, healthy, 
happy lives.10 To achieve this requires PetSmart to understand market trends. 
 
The humanization of pets is the major overriding trend. Consumers are increasingly 
becoming pet parents who see and treat their pets as members of the family. This has 
resulted in premium products in pet foods, many of which are higher priced with higher 
gross margins and exclusively available in specialty pet stores. The 2007 melamine-
contaminated dog and cat food problem reportedly caused more than 3,500 animal deaths 
further reinforced the trend toward natural and organic pet foods. The natural and holistic 
food sales market has been growing at a 20 percent annually. 11 
 
Humanization has also impacted sales of pet supplies. Higher quality and personalized 
products include monogrammed sweaters, digitized collars, designer clothes and 
accessories. Companies like Paul Mitchell, Omaha Steaks, Harley Davidson and Old 
Navy are now offering dog shampoo, pet apparel and toys.11 
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Humanization has impacted pet services the most. Full service grooming, haircuts, baths, 
toenail trimming and tooth brushing are growing in importance. Veterinary services and 
medicine are growing even faster with the emphasis on health and longevity. 11 
Vet care is estimated at $13.6 billion and pet supplies and over the counter medicine at 
$11.8 billion for 2012.1 Concern for obesity and pet health insurance are some other 
emerging trends. 
 
How has PetSmart reacted to the trend toward humanization? First their customer insights 
programs tracts customers shopping behavior and preferences. They have identified their  
target market as female, average age 46, strong emotional bond with pet, wants the best 
for her pet, and affluent with income 30 percent higher than the average household and 
spends 78 percent more than the average pet owner. The primary focus is on customers 
with a “heart” who shop PetSmart 10 or more times a year. This segment accounts for 
only 13 percent of their customers, but 51 percent of sales and have an average amount 
spent of $657 per year. Their secondary target market is the “smart” customer who shops 
PetSmart two to nine times a year. They account for 48 percent of the customers, 41 
percent of the sales and average $150 in annual customer spending. The last customer 
group is the “mart” segment which accounts for 39 percent of the customers, eight 
percent of the sales, but only spends $34 annually.12 
 
Second, PetSmart has increasingly focused on channel-exclusive pet foods. They have 
also developed and expanded their proprietary brands. For example, in consumables they 
have Great Choice in the good category, Authority and Dentley’s in the better category 
and Simply Nourish in the best category. In hard goods they have Great Choice in the 
good category, Top Paw and petholiday in the better category and Martha Stewart Pets, 
Toys ‘R’ US Pets and GNC in the best category.12 
 
Third, PetSmart continues expanding pet services. It has grooming and training in all of 
its stores, 194 PetsHotels, and 800 Banfield, The Pet Hospitals.12 Services sales were 
$675 million or 11 percent of total sales in 2011. PetSmart does not include sales of 
Banfield which is 20 percent owned by PetSmart.10 
 
Fourth, above all, PetSmart is focusing on the consumer’s in-store experience. Associates 
are trained to know customer and pet names. They strive to provide Total Lifetime Care, 
Superior Service, clean stores, short check-out lines, a strong in-stock position, an 
effective supply chain and outstanding pet care.10 
 
PetSmart’s operating statements and financial position improved significantly in the early 
2000s. Sales and profits increased 103 percent and 383 percent between 2002 and 2009, 
largely bolstered by the addition approximately 100 new stores a year. Under the 
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leadership of Moran from 2009 to 2011, sales have increased by 21 percent to $6.1 
billion and profits have increased by 50 percent to $290 billion. New store growth has 
moderated to adding 40 to 50 annually (see Appendix C). Emphasis has shifted to 
improving store productivity by pursuing its differentiation strategy and improving its 
customer focus, especially on the humanization of animals. 
 
PetSmart’s rapid rise, fall, resurgence and redirection have been challenging. It has 
become best in class among the specialty pet store industry, yet it faces continuing 
challenges from consumer trends, competitors, suppliers as well as becoming 
complacent. Robert Moran and the executive leadership seek was to grow the company 
through its differentiation strategy focusing on pet parents and pets Lifetime Care. Has 
PetSmart found a sustainable strategy? 
 
 
                                                 
1 American Pet Products Association, APPA web site, retrieved July 19, 2012. 
 
2 Mintel, The Pet Food & Supplies Market, Mintel Group Ltd., London, 2007. 
 
3 U.S. Census Bureau, Census of Retail Trade, 2001 and 2007. 
 
4 PetSmart, PetSmart web site, retrieved August 10, 2012. 
 
5 PetSmart Annual Reports, retrieved from PetSmart;s web site, August 7, 2012. 
 
6 Francis, Philip, interview at PetSmart Headquarters, Phoenix, AZ, May 2, 2008. 
 
7 Francis, Philip, Guest Lecturer at Marshall School of Business, University of Southern  
   California, January 2008. 
 
8 Dalton, Catherine M. A Passion for Pets: An interview with Philip Francis, September 
15, 2006. 
 
9 Jones, Justin, “Philip Francis of PetSmart”, International Herald Tribune, February 8,  
  2008. 
 
10 PetSmart, 2011 PetSmart Annual Report, retrieved from PetSmart website, August 8,  
     2012. 
 
11 IBISWorld, pet Stores in the U.S., retrieved from IBIS World web site, August 8,  
     2012. 
 
12 PetSmart, Investor Presentation First Quarter 2012, retrieved from company web site,  
     May 2012. 
12 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
Appendix A: Selected PetSmart Chronology Taken From Annual Reports 
1980s Jim and Janice Dougherty run a store called Petfood Supermarket. They develop the 
concept of a discount pet food warehouse. 
  
1986  Doughertys secure a venture capital loan from the Phillips Van Heusen Corporation and 
become incorporated as Pacific Coast Distributing, Inc.  
  
1987 Doughertys open two stores under the name The Pet Food Warehouse.  
1988 Five additional stores are established in Arizona, Colorado, and Texas.  
1989 Samuel J. Parker Joins the firm and Phil Francis becomes a Director of the 
company 
1989 Pet grooming services are offered for the first time in its Colorado store.  We 
change the name and logo of our stores from PetFood Warehouse to PETsMART. 
1990 We contract with a veterinarian company to bring mobile clinics to our stores to perform 
vaccinations. 
  
1992 We open our own permanent adoption centers, which we call the Luv-A-Pet Adoption 
Center.  
  
1993 PETsMART goes public, listed under the symbol “PETM”. 
  
1994 We reach an agreement with Medical Management International in Portland, Ore., to 
operate full-service, state-of-the-art vet clinics in our stores.  
  
 Purchased Weisheimer Companies which operated 29 PETZAZZ stores in the Midwest. 
  
1995  Purchased PetStuff and its 56 stores 
 
 Purchased Pet Food Giant and its 10 superstores 
  
Purchased Sporting Dog Specialties the leading catalog retailer of pet supplies and 
accessories. 
  
1996  Purchased Pet City Holdings, the largers pet specialty retailer in the U.K. that operated 
57 Pet City stores. 
 
 Entered Canada by opening eight stores in Ontario. 
  
Purchased State Line Tack, the leading catalog retailer that specialized in discount riding 
an equine supplies. 
  
1997 Inventory problems are encountered; Sam Parker, President and CEO who took 
the company public resigns. 
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 The company reports a loss of $34.4 million and stock price falters. Sam Parker, 
former President and CEO, resumes the position of CEO to try and get the 
company back on track. 
1998 Phil Francis becomes our new President and CEO.  We begin opening smaller stores 
(19,000 square feet vs. 26,000 square feet) in markets that can only support one store. 
  
2000 Our stock price hits an all-time low. 
  
2000 Medical Management International, Inc. operates the 239 vet clinics in our stores under 
the name Banfield, The Pet Hospital. 
  
2001 The company begins a new advertising campaign entitled 'PETsMART: All You 
Need for the Life of Your Pet.'  
2002 We begin testing PETsHOTEL in two of our Phoenix stores.  In addition to our two 
major distribution centers, we now have six smaller distribution centers in Phoenix; 
Ennis, Texas; Gahanna, Ohio; Hagerstown, Md.; Newnan, Ga.; and Reno, Nev. 
  
2003 We finish remodeling our stores, so now all of our stores are more customer and pet 
friendly, easy to shop, bright and vibrant. 
  
2004 We open our third major distribution center, which is in Ottawa, Illinois. 
  
2005 We become PetSmart. We continue to update all of our stores. 
  
2006 Services grow by 26 percent. We open our 50th PetsHotel and announce that we plan to 
open a total of 435. Our sales for the fiscal year are $4.2 billion and our EPS is $1.33. 
  
2007  Purchase 19 SuperPet stores in Canada. 
  
2009  Robert Moran is appointed Chairman and CEO. 
 Philip Francis becomes Executive Chairman. 
  
2012  Philip Francis retires. 
 
 Robert Moran takes over complete leadership of PetSmart. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
14 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
Appendix B ‐‐ From Growth to Crisis 
 
PetSmart Financials FY 1993‐1998 
 
Fiscal Year  2/1/98  2/2/97  1/28/96  1/29/95  1/30/94  1/31/93 
 
Operating Financials 
 
Net Sales ($ in mil.)  1,791  1,501  1,168  924  545  320 
 
Gross Profit ($ in mil.)  434  426  308  246  149  96 
 
Oper., Gen. & Adm. (S in mil.)  412  343  270  238  154  93 
 
Net Income ($ in mil.)  ‐34  43  ‐9  ‐6  ‐5  3 
 
Operating Percentages 
 
Gross Profit  24.2  28.4  26.4  26.6  27.4  30.1 
 
Oper., Gen. & Adm.  23.0  22.9  23.1  25.8  28.3  29.1 
 
Net income  ‐1.9  2.8  ‐0.7  ‐0.7  ‐0.9  1.0 
 
Selected Operationg Data 
 
Stores at End of Period  468  376  297  269  192  103 
 
Net Sales per Square Foot ($)  177  176  172  162  175  197 
 
Net Sales Growth (%)  19.3  28.5  26.4  69.7  70.4  79.5 
 
Comparable Store Sales Growth (%)  4.6  11.9  12.5  19.1  19.8  19.0 
 
Inventory Turnover (Times/Year)  5.6  5.0  5.5  5.4  5.1  5.4 
 
Average Store Inventory ($ Thousands)  679  800  714  673  561  580 
 
 
NOTE: Data are rounded.  
 
Source:  PetSmart SEC Filings and Annual Reports 
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Appendix C  ‐‐ Recovery and Refocus 
 
 
PetSmart Financials  
 
FY 2006‐2011 
 
Fiscal Year 
 
1/29/12  1/31/11  1/31/10  2/1/09  2/3/08  1/28/07  1/29/06 
Operating Financials   
 
Net Sales  
($ in mil.) 
 
 
6,113  5,694  5,337  5,065  4,673  4,234  3,761 
 
Gross Profit  
($ in mil.) 
 
 
1,804  1,655  1,519  1,495  1,437  1,308  1,173 
 
Oper., Gen. & Adm.  
(S in mil.) 
 
 
1,301  1,226  1,150  1,126  1,085  986  862 
 
Net Income  
($ in mil.) 
 
 
290  240  198  193  259  186  183 
 
Operating Percentages 
 
Gross Profit 
 
        29.5  29.1  28.5  29.5  30.7  30.9  31.2 
 
Oper., Gen. & Adm. 
 
       21.3  21.5  21.6  22.2  23.2  23.3  22.9 
 
Net income 
 
4.7  4.2  3.7  3.8  5.5  4.4  4.9 
 
Selected Operation Data 
 
 
Stores at End of Period 
 
1,232  1,187  1,149  1,112  1,008  908  826 
Net Sales per Square Foot ($)  224  214  205  202  210  208  206 
 
Net Sales Growth (%) 
 
7.4  6.7  5.4  8.4  10.4  12.6  11.8 
Comparable Store Sales Growth (%)   5.4  4.8  1.6  3.8  2.4  5.0  4.2 
 
Inventory Turnover (Times/Year) 
 
9.5  9.3  9.5  8.7  9.3  8.7  9.4 
 
Average Store Inventory ($ Thousands) 
 
523  519  490  525  497  537  484 
 
NOTES:  
 
Data are rounded,  
From PetSmart SEC Filings and Annual 
Reports  
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Appendix C ‐‐ Recovery and Refocus 
(Continued) 
         
PetSmart Financials  
  
FY 1999‐2005         
 
Fiscal Year  1/30/05  2/1/04  2/2/03  2/3/02  1/28/01  1/30/00  2/1/99 
Operating Financials         
 
Net Sales ($ in mil.)  3,364  2,993  2,695  2,501  2,224  2,110  2,109 
 
Gross Profit ($ in mil.)  1,039  900  783  710  557  572  528 
 
Oper., Gen. & Adm. ($ in mil.)  781  681  630  640  536  484  470 
 
Net Income ($ in mil.)  158  125  79  40  ‐31  ‐32  23 
 
Operating Percentages         
 
Gross Profit  30.9  30.0  29.1  28.4  25.0  27.1  25.0 
 
Oper., Gen. & Adm.  23.2  22.8  23.4  25.6  24.1  22.9  22.3 
 
Net income  4.7  4.2  2.9  1.6  ‐1.3  ‐1.5  1.1 
 
Selected Operating Data         
 
Stores at End of Period  726  643  583  560  533  484  534 
 
Net Sales per Square Foot ($)  205  197  188  177  161  163  175 
 
Net Sales Growth (%)  12.4  11.1  7.8  12.4  5.4  0.0  17.8 
 
Comparable Store Sales Growth (%)  6.3  7.0  9.6  6.5  1.4  4.6  6.3 
 
Inventory Turnover (Times/Year)  10.0  9.7  10.5  9.2  6.9  5.6  6.3 
 
Average Store Inventory ($ Thousands)  465  481  441  485  605  780  686 
 
 
NOTES: Data are rounded, NA = Not 
Available, Source of information – PetSmart 
SEC Filings and Annual Reports          
 
  
